Comments on: Like I Said… http://palady.wordpress.com/2007/09/23/like-i-said/ Tue, 13 Oct 2009 22:51:29 +0000 http://wordpress.com/ hourly 1 By: PA_Lady http://palady.wordpress.com/2007/09/23/like-i-said/#comment-22392 PA_Lady Tue, 25 Sep 2007 17:39:21 +0000 http://palady.wordpress.com/2007/09/23/like-i-said/#comment-22392 I quite agree. While those first few airmen in the chain are (undeservedly) getting the bulk of the blame, I would guess everyone involved had a "same-old, same-old" attitude, right up to the base commander. Attitude, like the proverbial smelly stuff, rolls downhill. If procedures are enforced and short-cuts disallowed, mistakes are lessened or eliminated. Add lax enforcement to cuts in force levels, differing priorities by senior commanders, etc... it's easy to see how it can happen. I quite agree. While those first few airmen in the chain are (undeservedly) getting the bulk of the blame, I would guess everyone involved had a “same-old, same-old” attitude, right up to the base commander.

Attitude, like the proverbial smelly stuff, rolls downhill. If procedures are enforced and short-cuts disallowed, mistakes are lessened or eliminated. Add lax enforcement to cuts in force levels, differing priorities by senior commanders, etc… it’s easy to see how it can happen.

]]> By: Adam Hyland http://palady.wordpress.com/2007/09/23/like-i-said/#comment-22387 Adam Hyland Tue, 25 Sep 2007 14:29:35 +0000 http://palady.wordpress.com/2007/09/23/like-i-said/#comment-22387 I think the comment left by sjm12561 is partially correct. Very rarely is a mishap solely caused by the screwups of a few people at the scene of the accident. We talk about assuming conv. vs. nuclear weapons, and this might have been the proximate cause of the failure, but the ultimate cause is obscured to us. Likely it is obscured to the people involved as well. Maybe handling requirements were relaxed for weapons only in storage (exceedingly doubtful, but possible as an informal policy). Maybe the command simply signaled to the officers and men that following the procedure wasn't the highest proiority (over, say, getting the job done and moving things around). This is possible, because all it takes to signal that is a lack of drills and inspections and a higher pressure to do more with less time. Although this means that one or two airmen aren't to blame, it doesn't mean that the post's summary is garbage. when thing like moving weapons becomes routinized, it is very hard to keep people on their toes about following all the (now seemingly stupid) rules. I think the comment left by sjm12561 is partially correct. Very rarely is a mishap solely caused by the screwups of a few people at the scene of the accident. We talk about assuming conv. vs. nuclear weapons, and this might have been the proximate cause of the failure, but the ultimate cause is obscured to us. Likely it is obscured to the people involved as well.

Maybe handling requirements were relaxed for weapons only in storage (exceedingly doubtful, but possible as an informal policy). Maybe the command simply signaled to the officers and men that following the procedure wasn’t the highest proiority (over, say, getting the job done and moving things around). This is possible, because all it takes to signal that is a lack of drills and inspections and a higher pressure to do more with less time.

Although this means that one or two airmen aren’t to blame, it doesn’t mean that the post’s summary is garbage. when thing like moving weapons becomes routinized, it is very hard to keep people on their toes about following all the (now seemingly stupid) rules.

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